Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) offers several advantages to both service providers and users. Service providers can benefit from the reduction of Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), better scalability, and better resource utilization. On the other hand, users can use the service anywhere and anytime, and minimize upfront investment by following the pay-as-you-go model. Despite the benefits of SaaS, users still have concerns about the security and privacy of their data. Due to the nature of SaaS and the Cloud in general, the data and the computation are beyond the users' control, and hence data security becomes a vital factor in this new paradigm. Furthermore, in multi-tenant SaaS applications, the tenants become more concerned about the confidentiality of their data since several tenants are co-located onto a shared infrastructure.
To address those concerns, we start protecting the data from the provisioning process by controlling how tenants are being placed in the infrastructure. We present a resource allocation algorithm designed to minimize the risk of co-resident tenants called SecPlace. It enables the SaaS provider to control the resource (i.e., database instance) allocation process while taking into account the security of tenants as a requirement.
Due to the design principles of the multi-tenancy model, tenants follow some degree of sharing on both application and infrastructure levels. Thus, strong security-isolation should be present. Therefore, we develop SignedQuery, a technique that prevents one tenant from accessing others' data. We use the Signing Concept to create a signature that is used to sign the tenant's request, then the server can verifies the signature and recognizes the requesting tenant, and hence ensures that the data to be accessed is belonging to the legitimate tenant.
Finally, Data confidentiality remains a critical concern due to the fact that data in the Cloud is out of users' premises, and hence beyond their control. Cryptography is increasingly proposed as a potential approach to address such a challenge. Therefore, we present SecureDB, a system designed to run SQL-based applications over an encrypted database. SecureDB captures the schema design and analyzes it to understand the internal structure of the data (i.e., relationships between the tables and their attributes). Moreover, we determine the appropriate partialhomomorphic encryption scheme for each attribute where computation is possible even when the data is encrypted.
To evaluate our work, we conduct extensive experiments with di↵erent settings. The main use case in our work is a popular open source HRM application, called OrangeHRM. The results show that our multi-layered approach is practical, provides enhanced security and isolation among tenants, and have a moderate complexity in terms of processing encrypted data.