# Dynamically Delayed Postdictive Completeness and Consistency in Learning 

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#### Abstract

In computational function learning in the limit, an algorithmic learner tries to find a program for a computable function $g$ given successively more values of $g$, each time outputting a conjectured program for $g$. A learner is called postdictively complete iff all available data is correctly postdicted by each conjecture.

Akama and Zeugmann presented, for each choice of natural number $\delta$, a relaxation to postdictive completeness: each conjecture is required to postdict only all except the last $\delta$ seen data points.

This paper extends this notion of delayed postdictive completeness from constant delays to dynamically computed delays. On the one hand, the delays can be different for different data points. On the other hand, delays no longer need to be by a fixed finite number, but any type of computable countdown is allowed, including, for example, countdown in a system of ordinal notations and in other graphs disallowing computable infinitely descending counts.

We extend many of the theorems of Akama and Zeugmann and provide some feasible learnability results. Regarding fairness in feasible learning, one needs to limit use of tricks that postpone output hypotheses until there is enough time to "think" about them. We see, for polytime learning, postdictive completeness (and delayed variants): 1 . allows some but not all postponement tricks, and 2 . there is a surprisingly tight boundary, for polytime learning, between what postponement is allowed and what is not. For example: 1. the set of polytime computable functions is polytime postdictively completely learnable employing some postponement, but 2. the set of exptime computable functions, while polytime learnable with a little more postponement, is not polytime postdictively completely learnable! We have that, for $w$ a notation for $\omega$, the set of exptime functions is polytime learnable with $w$-delayed postdictive completeness. Also provided are generalizations to further, small constructive limit ordinals.


## 1 Introduction

"Explanatory learning", or Ex-learning for short, is a standard model of limit learning of computable functions. In this model a learner is given successively longer initial segments of a target function. For each initial segment of the target
function, the learner gives an hypothesis. The learner is said to successfully Exlearn the target function iff the infinite sequence of hypotheses generated by the learner on the initial segments of the target functions converges in the limit to a (single) correct program for the target function JORS99.

In some literature on limit learning this intuitively simple success criterion is used as a minimal requirement for success, and additional requirements are defined and examined. We call two such extra requirements postdictive completeness (the hypotheses correctly postdict the data seen so far) and postdictive consistency (the hypotheses do not explicitly contradict the given data) Bār74, BB75, Wie76, Wie78, 1] There are Ex-learnable sets of functions that cannot be learned with the additional requirement of postdictive completeness or consistency.

Akama and Zeugmann AZ07 presented success criteria that are a little less restrictive than postdictively complete Ex-learning. Their criteria delay the requirement to postdict a given datum by a fixed natural number $\delta$ of (not necessarily distinct) hypotheses output. For ordinary postdictive completeness, if a learner $h$ has seen so far, on a computable $g$ input, $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1)$, then $h$ 's corresponding hypothesis, $p_{n}$, must correctly compute $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1) \cdot 2$ For delay $\delta$, Akama and Zeugmann, require only that, on $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1)$, h's later hypothesis, $p_{n+\delta}$, must correctly compute $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1)$. Essentially, the delay $\delta$ learner could, after seeing $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1)$, run a counter down from $\delta$ to 0 to see which future hypothesis must correctly compute $g(0), \ldots, g(n-1)$.

In the present paper we extend this notion of delayed postdictive completeness from constant delays $\delta$ to dynamically computed delays. One of the ways we consider herein to do this involves counting down from notations for constructive ordinals. We explain. Everyone knows how to use the natural numbers for counting, including for counting down. Freivalds and Smith [FS93, as well as ACJS04, employed in learning theory notations for constructive ordinals Rog67, § 11.7] as devices for algorithmic counting down. Theorems 4 and 5 in Section 3 provide strong justification for studying the herein ordinal countdown variants of Postdictive Completeness.

SSV04] gives a further generalized notion of counting down. They consider certain partial orders with no computable infinitely descending chains. In the present paper we consider arbitrary and also computable graphs with no infinite, computable paths, and we algorithmically count "down" along their paths. Theorem 11 in Section 4.2 below, gives a nice example of a linearly ordered, com-

[^0]putable such graph which nonetheless has infinite paths (just not computable ones). We call our graphs in the present paper, countdown graphs.

We make use of countdown graphs for delaying the requirement of postdictive completeness (respectively, consistency) by requiring a learner to start an independent countdown for each datum $g(i)$ seen and to be postdictively complete (respectively, consistent) regarding $g(i)$ as soon as the countdown for $g(i)$ terminates 3

Section 2 will introduce the notation and concepts used in this paper.
In the prior literature we also see further variants of postdictive completeness and consistency not based on delay. For example, CJSW04 surveys with references these variants. Roughly, below, when we attach $\mathcal{R}$ to the front of a name of a criterion requiring postdictive completeness or consistency, this means that the associated learnability must be witnessed by a (total) computable learner as opposed to just a partial computable learner (defined at least where it minimally needs to be); when we attach a $\mathcal{T}$ to the front of a name of a criterion requiring postdictive completeness (respectively, consistency), this means that the associated learnability must be witnessed by a (total) computable learner which is postdictively complete (respectively, consistent) on all input functions regardless of whether the learner actually learns them.

Sections 3 and 4 present our results. All of our results in Section 3 provide information about polynomial time learners. Furthermore, some of our results in Section 4.1 entail learnability with linear time learners. These time bounds are uniform bounds on how much time it takes the learner to conjecture each hypothesis in terms of the total size of the input data it can use for making this conjecture. Suppose for discussion $p$ is a polynomial time bound. Pitt Pit89] notes that Ex-learning allows unfair postponement tricks, i.e., a learner $h$ can put off outputting significant conjectures based on data $\sigma$ until it has seen a much larger sequence of data $\tau$ so that $p(|\tau|)$ is enough time for $h$ to think about $\sigma$ as long as it needs $4_{4}^{4}$ In this way the polytime restriction on each output does not, by itself, have the desirable effect of constraining the total learning time. Pitt Pit89 then lays out some additional constraints toward avoiding "cheating" by such postponement tricks. He discusses in this regard what we are calling postdictive completeness. He also considers further constraints since he wants to forbid enumeration techniques JORS99. For our complexity-bounded results in Section 4.1 we get by with an extremely fair, restricted kind of linear-time learner, we call transductive. A transductive learner has access only to its current datum.

In Section 3 we see, from Theorems 4 and 5 and the proof of the first, that, for polytime learning, postdictive completeness (and delayed variants): 1. allows some but not all postponement tricks, and 2 . there is a surprisingly tight boundary, for polytime learning, between what postponement is allowed and what is not. For example: 1. the set of polytime computable functions is polytime

[^1]postdictively completely Ex-learnable (by a complexity-bounded enumeration technique) employing some postponement, but 2. the set of exptime computable functions, while polytime Ex-learnable with a little more postponement, is not polytime postdictively completely Ex-learnable! From Theorem 4 we see that, for $w$ a notation for $\omega$, the set of exptime functions is polytime Ex-learnable with $w$-delayed postdictive completeness. Theorems 4 and 5 also provide generalizations to further, small constructive limit ordinals.

Section 4.1 shows how the different variants of our criteria relate in learning power. Our main theorem in this section is Theorem 6. For example, it entails that there is a set of computable functions which is postdictively consistently learnable (with no delays) by a transductive, linear time learner but is not postdictively completely learnable with delays employing any countdown graph.

In Section 4.2, our main result, Theorem 13 , entails (including with Corollaries) complete characterizations of learning power in dependence on associated (computable) countdown graphs. Corollary 16 extends the finite hierarchy given in AZ07 into the constructive transfinite.

We omit most proofs due to space constraints. A more complete version of the present paper can be found online CK08. Many of our omitted proofs use Kleene's Recursion Theorem [Rog67, page 214, problem 11-4] or the Case's Operator Recursion Theorem Cas74 (and are a bit combinatorially difficult).

## 2 Mathematical Preliminaries

Any unexplained complexity-theoretic notions are from RC94. All unexplained general computability-theoretic notions are from Rog67.

Strings herein are finite and over the alphabet $\{0,1\} .\{0,1\}^{*}$ denotes the set of all such strings; $\varepsilon$ denotes the empty string.
$\mathbb{N}$ denotes the set of natural numbers, $\{0,1,2, \ldots\}$. We do not distinguish between natural numbers and their dyadic representations as strings. 5

For each $w \in\{0,1\}^{*}$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}, w^{n}$ denotes $n$ copies of $w$ concatenated end to end. For each string $w$, we define $\operatorname{size}(w)$ to be the length of $w$. As we identify each natural number $x$ with its dyadic representation, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\operatorname{size}(n)$ denotes the length of the dyadic representation of $n$. For all strings $w$, we define $|w|$ to be $\max \{1, \operatorname{size}(w)\}$. ${ }^{6}$

The symbols $\subseteq, \subset, \supseteq, \supset$ respectively denote the subset, proper subset, superset and proper superset relation between sets.

For sets $A, B$, we let $A \backslash B:=\{a \in A \mid a \notin B\}, \bar{A}:=\mathbb{N} \backslash A$.
We sometimes denote a function $f$ of $n>0$ arguments $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ in lambda notation (as in Lisp) as $\lambda x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n} . f\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$. For example, with $c \in \mathbb{N}$, $\lambda x . c$ is the constantly $c$ function of one argument.

[^2]A function $\psi$ is partial computable iff there is a Turing machine computing $\psi . \mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ denote the set of all (total) computable and partial computable functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, respectively. If $\psi$ is not defined for some argument $x$, then we denote this fact by $\psi(x) \uparrow$, and we say that $\psi$ on $x$ diverges. The opposite is denoted by $\psi(x) \downarrow$, and we say that $\psi$ on $x$ converges.

We say that a partial function $\psi$ converges to $p$ iff $\forall^{\infty} x: \psi(x) \downarrow=p$.
[RC94, §3] describes an efficiently numerically named or coded ${ }^{7}$ programming system for multi-tape Turing machines (TMs) which compute the partial computable functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. Herein we name this system $\varphi . \varphi_{p}$ denotes the partial computable function computed by the TM-program with code number $p$ in the $\varphi$-system, and $\Phi_{p}$ denotes the partial computable runtime function of the TMprogram with code number $p$ in the $\varphi$-system. In the present paper, we employ a number of complexity bound results from [RC94, §§ $3 \& 4]$ regarding $(\varphi, \Phi)$. These results will be clearly referenced as we use them.

We fix the 1-1 and onto pairing function $\langle\cdot, \cdot\rangle: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ from RC94, which is based on dyadic bit-interleaving. Pairing and unpairing is computable in linear time. $\pi_{1}$ and $\pi_{2}$, respectively, denote the unpairing into the left and right component of a given coded pair, respectively.

For all $f, g \in \mathcal{R}$ we let $\langle f, g\rangle$ denote $\lambda i \cdot\langle f(i), g(i)\rangle$.
Whenever we consider tuples of natural numbers as input to TMs, it is understood that the general coding function $\langle\cdot, \cdot\rangle$ is used to (left-associatively) code the tuples into appropriate TM-input.

A finite sequence is a mapping with a finite initial segment of $\mathbb{N}$ as domain (and range, $\mathbb{N}$ ). $\emptyset$ denotes the empty sequence (and, also, the empty set). The set of all finite sequences is denoted by Seq. For each finite sequence $\sigma$, we will denote the first element, if any, of that sequence by $\sigma(0)$, the second, if any, with $\sigma(1)$ and so on. $\operatorname{last}(\sigma)$ denotes the last element of $\sigma$, if any. \#elets $(\sigma)$ denotes the number of elements in a finite sequence $\sigma$, that is, the cardinality of its domain.

We use $\diamond$ (with infix notation) to denote concatenation on sequences. For any natural number $x$, we let $\bar{x}$ denote the sequence of length one with only element $x$, and we let $\bar{x}^{n}$ be the code of the sequence of length $n$, each element being $x$.

From now on, by convention, $f, g$ and $h$ with or without decoration range over (partial) functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}, x, y$ with or without decorations range over $\mathbb{N}$ and $\sigma, \tau$ with or without decorations range over finite sequences of natural numbers.

Following [LV97], we fix a coding $\langle\cdot\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$ of all sequences into $\mathbb{N}\left(=\{0,1\}^{*}\right)-$ with the following properties.

The set of all codes of sequences is decidable in linear time. The time to encode a sequence, that is, to compute $\lambda k, v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k} \cdot\left\langle v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k}\right\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$ is $\mathcal{O}\left(\lambda k, v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{k}\left|v_{i}\right|\right)$. Therefore, the size of the codeword is also linear in the size of the elements: $\lambda k, v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k} \cdot\left|\left\langle v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k}\right\rangle_{\text {Seq }}\right|$ is

[^3]$\mathcal{O}\left(\lambda k, v_{1}, \ldots, v_{k} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{k}\left|v_{i}\right|\right) \cdot 8$ We also have $\lambda\langle\sigma\rangle_{\text {Seq }} \bullet$ \#elets $(\sigma)$ is linear time computable; $\lambda\langle\sigma\rangle_{\mathrm{Seq}}, i \cdot\left\{\begin{array}{ll}\sigma(i), & \text { if } i<\# \operatorname{lets}(\sigma) ; \\ 0, & \text { otherwise, }\end{array}\right.$ is linear time computable; and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall \sigma: \# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma) \leq\left|\langle\sigma\rangle_{\text {Seq }}\right| \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Henceforth, we will many times identify a finite sequence $\sigma$ with its code number $\langle\sigma\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$. However, when we employ expressions such as $\sigma(x), \sigma=f$ and $\sigma \subset f$, we consider $\sigma$ as a sequence, not as a number.

For a partial function $g$ and $i \in \mathbb{N}$, if $\forall j<i: g(j) \downarrow$, then $g[i]$ is defined to be the finite sequence $g(0), \ldots, g(i-1)$.

A pre-order is a pair $\left(A, \leq_{A}\right)$ such that $\leq_{A}$ is a transitive and reflexive binary relation on $A$.

Church and Kleene introduced systems of ordinal notations. See Rogers Rog67, § 11.7]. For us, a system of ordinal notations is a pair ( $\left.\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ and associated functions $k_{\mathcal{N}}, p_{\mathcal{N}}, q_{\mathcal{N}} \in \mathcal{P}$ and $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}$ mapping $\mathcal{N}$ into the set of all constructive ordinals, such that $\mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, and, for all $u, v \in \mathcal{N}$, we have: $u \leq_{\mathcal{N}} v$ iff $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u) \leq \nu_{\mathcal{N}}(v)$; if $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u)=0$, then $k_{\mathcal{N}}(u)=0$; if $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u)$ is successor ordinal, then $k_{\mathcal{N}}(u)=1$ and $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}\left(p_{\mathcal{N}}(u)\right)+1=\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u)$; if $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u)$ is limit ordinal, then $k_{\mathcal{N}}(u)=2$ and $\varphi_{q_{\mathcal{N}}(u)}$ is a monotonic increasing computable function such that $\nu_{\mathcal{N}} \circ \varphi_{q_{\mathcal{N}}(u)}$ converges to $\nu_{\mathcal{N}}(u)$.

Note that $\leq_{\mathcal{N}}$ is not necessarily computable. If it is, then $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ is called computably related.

For countdown in polynomial time, we use feasibly related feasible systems of ordinal notations CKP07. In such systems, many predicates and operations on notations are feasibly computable. For example, one can use the (efficiently) coded tuple $\left\langle a_{n}, \ldots, a_{0}\right\rangle$ as a notation for the ordinal $\omega^{n} \cdot a_{n}+\ldots \omega^{0} \cdot a_{0}$. The resulting system of ordinal notations gives a notation to all ordinals $<\omega^{\omega}$ and allows for polytime comparing, adding and so on.

Note that, for any constructive ordinal $\alpha$, there is a computably related system of ordinal notations which gives a notation to $\alpha$ Rog67; furthermore, there is also a feasibly related feasible system of ordinal notations giving a notation to $\alpha$ CKP07.

In this paper we consider several indexed families of learning criteria. We proceed somewhat abstractly to avoid needless terminological repetitions.

For each $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ and $\delta \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{2}$, we say that the pair $(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$ is a learning criterion (for short, criterion). The set $\mathcal{C}$ is called a learner admissibility restriction, and intuitively serves as a limitation on what functions will be considered as learners. Typical learner admissibility restrictions are $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}$, as well as complexity classes. The predicate $\delta$ is called a sequence acceptance criterion, intuitively restricting what output-sequences by the learner are considered a successful learning of a given function. For $h \in \mathcal{P}, g \in \mathcal{R}$ we say that $h(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$-learns $g$ iff $h \in \mathcal{C}$ and $(\lambda x . h(g[x]), g) \in \delta$. For $h \in \mathcal{P}, g \in \mathcal{R}$, we call $\lambda x . h(g[x])$ the learning-sequence of $h$ given $g$. Here's an example $\delta$, herein called Ex. Let Ex $=\{(\langle p, d\rangle, q) \in$

[^4]$\mathcal{R}^{2} \mid p$ converges to some $\left.e \wedge \varphi_{e}=q\right\}$. Intuitively, $(\langle p, d\rangle, q) \in \mathbf{E x}$ means that the learning-sequence $\langle p, d\rangle$ successfully learns the function $q$ iff: for some $i, p(i)$ is a correct program number for $q$, and this hypothesized program number will never change after that point $i$. N.B. For this example, the learning-sequence is a sequence of coded pairs and Ex completely disregards the second component $d$. Some other sequence acceptance criteria below make use of $d$ as an auxiliary output of the learner. In these cases, $d$ will code countdowns until some events of interest must happen. For $h \in \mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ we say that $h(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$-learns $\mathcal{S}$ iff, for all $g \in \mathcal{S}, h(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$-learns $g$. The set of $(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$-learnable sets of computable functions is $\mathcal{C} \delta:=\{\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{R} \mid \exists h \in \mathcal{C}: h(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$-learns $\mathcal{S}\}$. Instead of writing the pair $(\mathcal{C}, \delta)$, we will ambiguously write $\mathcal{C} \delta$. We will omit $\mathcal{C}$ if $\mathcal{C}=\mathcal{P} 9$ One way to combine two sequence acceptance criteria $\delta$ and $\delta^{\prime}$ is to intersect them as sets. We write $\delta \delta^{\prime}$ for the intersection, and we present examples featuring countdowns in the next section.

We can turn a given sequence acceptance criterion $\delta$ into a learner admissibility restriction $\mathcal{T} \delta$ by admitting only those learners that obey $\delta$ on all input: $\mathcal{T} \delta:=\{h \in \mathcal{P} \mid \forall g \in \mathcal{R}:(\lambda x . h(g[x]), g) \in \delta\}$.

The following two definitions formalize the intuitive discussion about countdown graphs as given above in Section 1

A graph is a pair $(G, \rightarrow)$, where $G \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ and $\rightarrow$ is a binary relation on $G$. We will use infix notation for $\rightarrow$. For each graph $(G, \rightarrow)$, we say that $\tau$ is a $G$-path iff $\# \operatorname{elets}(\tau)>0, \forall i<\# \operatorname{lets}(\tau): \tau(i) \in G$ and $\forall i<\# \operatorname{elets}(\tau)-1: \tau(i) \rightarrow \tau(i+1)$. For each graph $G$, let $\vec{G}$ denote the set of all $G$-paths. $(S, R)$ is a subgraph of $(G, \rightarrow)$, iff $S \subseteq G$ and $R$ is $\rightarrow$ restricted to $(S \times S)$.

For all $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$, we write $m \rightarrow^{*} n$ (respectively, $m \rightarrow^{+} n$ ) iff there is a $G$-path $\tau$ such that $\tau(0)=m, \operatorname{last}(\tau)=n$ (respectively, additionally $\# \operatorname{elets}(\tau)>1)$. We sometimes write $G$ for $(G, \rightarrow)$. A graph $(G, \rightarrow)$ is said to be computable iff $G$ and $\rightarrow$ are computable. Note that $G \in \mathcal{G}$ is computable iff $\vec{G}$ is computable. For a graph $(G, \rightarrow)$ we sometimes identify $m \in G$ with $\left\{n \in G \mid m \rightarrow^{+} n\right\}$. With every pre-order $\left(A, \leq_{A}\right)$ we associate the graph $\left(A,>_{A}\right)$, where, for all $a, b \in A$, $a>_{A} b$ iff $\left(b \leq_{A} a\right.$ and $\left.a \not \leq_{A} b\right)$.

A graph $(G, \rightarrow)$ is called a countdown graph, iff $\neg \exists r \in \mathcal{R} \forall i \in \mathbb{N}: r(i) \rightarrow$ $r(i+1)$. Note that if $G$ is a countdown graph, then so is every subgraph of $G$. Let $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}$, respectively, denote the set of all and all computable countdowngraphs, respectively.

Example countdown graphs can be obtained from systems of ordinal notations. Let $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ be a system of ordinal notations. Then, $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ is a preorder without infinite descending chains, so the graph associated with $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ is a countdown graph. If $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ is computably related, then the associated graph will be computable.

[^5]In Theorem 11 below we give one example of a countdown graph not based on a system of ordinal notations.

Soon we define what postdictive completeness, respectively consistency, with respect to $G \in \mathcal{G}$ means. Intuitively, every learner is required to have two outputs: a hypothesis, and a countdown output. For any learnee $g \in \mathcal{R}$, if the learner sees $g[i]$, the countdown output will need to encode one countdown for each $j<i$. As soon as the countdown for a given data item is over, the hypothesis has to be postdictively complete, respectively consistent, for that data item. We will refer to the countdown output of a learner as a multicount (as it represents more than one countdown). We refer to a learning-output of hypothesis and multicount as a hypothesis-multicount.

The set of all multicountdown sequences is defined as $\mathbb{M}:=\{\sigma \in \mathbb{S e q} \mid \forall i<$ $\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma):(\sigma(i) \in \mathbb{S e q} \wedge \# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma(i))=i)\}$

An example multicountdown sequence is $\sigma_{0}:=\langle \rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 3\rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 2,3\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$, $\langle 1,2,2\rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 0,1,2,1\rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 0,0,2,2,2\rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 2,0,2,3,1,1\rangle_{\text {Seq }},\langle 0,0,2,7,0,0,5\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$. $\sigma_{0}$ can be displayed as a matrix like this:

In (2) each column is a multicount. For example, column $x=4$ represents the multicount $\sigma_{0}(4)=\langle 0,1,2,1\rangle$. Each row of (2) provides the successive values of a particular countdown. For example, the $n$-th row of (2) (without initial empty entries) is the $n$-th countdown of $\sigma_{0}$. As we will see below, for an associated learnee $g$, the $n$-th row will be relevant to $g(n)$.

For each $\sigma \in \mathbb{M}$ and $n<\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma)-1$ we define $\operatorname{row}(n, \sigma):=\langle\sigma(n+$ $1)(n), \ldots, \sigma(\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma)-1)(n)\rangle_{\text {seq }}$. For $\sigma_{0}$ as presented above in (22), we have, for example, $\operatorname{row}\left(4, \sigma_{0}\right)=\langle 2,1,0\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$. $\operatorname{Each} \operatorname{row}(n, \sigma)$ is a countdown.

We will consider a given countdown sequence $\tau$ as terminated with respect to a given countdown graph $G \in \mathcal{G}$, iff $\tau \notin \vec{G}$. We then say that " $\tau$ has terminated" or " $\tau$ has bottomed out". For a given multicountdown sequence we will define the set of all $n$ such that the $n$-th countdown has (started and) bottomed out just below. For all $\sigma$ and all $G \in \mathcal{G}$, define $\perp_{G}(\sigma)=\{n<\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma)-1 \mid \sigma \notin$ $\mathbb{M} \vee \operatorname{row}(n, \sigma) \notin \vec{G}\}$. We omit the subscript $G$ whenever no confusion can arise.

We pronounce $\perp$ as "bottom". For $\sigma \in \mathbb{M}, \perp(\sigma)$ is the set of all countdown numbers where the countdown has terminated.

Let us, for example, consider the finite countdown graph $G$ on $\{0,1,2,3\}$ with the natural $>$-order on $\mathbb{N}$. For $\sigma_{0}$ depicted above in (2), we have $\perp_{G}\left(\sigma_{0}\right)=$

[^6]$\{0,1,2,3,6\}$. The example of rows $n=4$ and $n=5$ shows that reaching a minimal element (in this case 0 ) of $G$ does not imply immediate termination of the countdown. The example of rows $n=2$ and $n=3$ shows how countdowns terminate when not obeying the graph relation. Note that the countdown for row $n=6$ has terminated immediately when it started, as it started with 5 , and $\langle 5\rangle_{\text {Seq }}$ is not a $G$-path. From rows $n=4$ and $n=6$ we see that the different countdowns do not have to terminate in row order.

Next we define two families of sequence acceptance criteria, employing countdowns as described above. The rest of the paper will be concerned with studying these criteria in various settings.

Definition 1. For $G \in \mathcal{G}$ let, for all $p, d, q \in \mathcal{R}$,
$-\mathbf{P c p}_{G}(\langle p, d\rangle, q): \Leftrightarrow \forall x \forall n \in \perp_{G}(d[x]): \varphi_{p(x)}(n) \downarrow=q(n)$; and
$-\operatorname{Pcs}_{G}(\langle p, d\rangle, q): \Leftrightarrow \forall x \forall n \in \perp_{G}(d[x]): \varphi_{p(x)}(n) \downarrow \Rightarrow \varphi_{p(x)}(n)=q(n)$.
For all $g \in \mathcal{R}$ and $h, f \in \mathcal{P}$, we say that $\langle h, f\rangle$ works postdictively completely (respectively, consistently) on $g$ with $G$-delay iff $(\lambda i \cdot(\langle h(g[i]), f(g[i])\rangle), g) \in \mathbf{P c p}_{G}$ (respectively, $\left.\mathbf{P c s}_{G}\right)$. We omit "with $G$-delay", if no confusion can arise.

## 3 Complexity Results

For this section only, let $\mathcal{N}$ be a feasibly related feasible system of ordinal notations for at least the ordinals $<\omega^{2}$. Let $w$ be a notation for $\omega$ in $\mathcal{N}$. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}, \underline{n}$ denotes a notation for $n$ in $\mathcal{N}$, such that $\lambda n \cdot \underline{n}$ is computable in polytime. We will assume for all constructive ordinals $\alpha$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, u \in \mathcal{N}:(u \text { is notation in } \mathcal{N} \text { for } \alpha+n) \Rightarrow n \leq u 11 \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Definition 2. Let $\exp$ denote the function $\lambda x \cdot 2^{x}$. Furthermore, for all $n$, we write $\exp ^{n}$ for the $n$-times application of exp. In particular, $\exp ^{0}$ denotes the identity. For all $k$ let $\operatorname{Exp}_{k}$ Programs $:=\{e \mid e \in \mathbb{N} \wedge \exists p$ polynomial $\forall n \in$ $\left.\mathbb{N}: \Phi_{e}(n) \leq \exp ^{k}(p(|n|))\right\}$ and $\mathbf{E X P}_{k} \mathbf{F}:=\left\{\varphi_{e} \mid e \in \operatorname{Exp}_{k}\right.$ Programs $\}$. Also, we let ExpPrograms $:=$ Exp $_{1}$ Programs, EXPF $:=$ EXP $_{1} \mathbf{F}$, PolyPrograms $:=$ $\operatorname{Exp}_{0}$ Programs and $\mathbf{P F}:=\mathbf{E X P}_{0} \mathbf{F}$.

For $g \in \mathbf{P F}$ we say that $g$ is computable in polytime, or also, feasibly computable. Recall that we have, by (11), $\forall \sigma: \# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma) \leq|\sigma|$.

Definition 3. Let $S, T$ be such that

$$
\begin{gather*}
\forall p, x, t: S(p, x, t)= \begin{cases}\varphi_{p}(x), & \text { if } \Phi_{p}(x) \leq|t| \\
0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}  \tag{4}\\
\forall p, x, t: T(p, x, t)= \begin{cases}1, & \text { if } \Phi_{p}(x) \leq|t| \\
0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} \tag{5}
\end{gather*}
$$

[^7]We now use the notion introduced above for subscripting our criteria with ordinal notations instead of countdown graphs.

## Theorem 4

(a) $\mathbf{P F} \in \mathbf{P F P c p}_{0} \mathbf{E x}$.
(b) $\mathbf{E X P F} \in \mathbf{P F} \overline{\mathbf{P}}_{\mathbf{c}}^{w}$ Ex.
(c) $\forall n: \mathbf{E X P}_{n} \mathbf{F} \in \mathbf{P F P c p}_{w \cdot \underline{n}} \mathbf{E x}$.

Furthermore, each of (a), (b) and (c) is witnessed by a respective learner $\langle h, f\rangle$ such that range $(h) \subseteq$ PolyPrograms, $\subseteq$ ExpPrograms and $\subseteq \operatorname{Exp}_{n}$ Programs, respectively.

Proof of (a). This proof employs a complexity-bounded enumeration technique JORS99. By RC94, Theorem 3.13], there is a linear time computable patch ${ }_{0}$ such that,

$$
\forall \sigma \forall x: \varphi_{\operatorname{patch}_{0}(\sigma)}(x)= \begin{cases}\sigma(x), & \text { if } x<\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma) ;  \tag{6}\\ 0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

and all outputs of patch ${ }_{0}$ are programs computable in linear time.
By RC94, Theorems 4.13(b) \& 4.17] there is a linear time computable $e$ such that $\mathbf{P F}=\left\{\varphi_{e(j)} \mid j \in \mathbb{N}\right\}$ and $\forall j \in \mathbb{N}: e(j) \in$ PolyPrograms. From RC94, Corollary 3.7] $S$ and $T$ from (4) and (5) above are polytime computable ${ }^{12}$ Then, by [RC94, Lemmas $3.15 \& 3.16]$, it is easy to see that there is $h \in \mathbf{P F}$ such that

$$
\forall \sigma: h(\sigma)= \begin{cases} & \text { if there is a minimal }  \tag{7}\\ e(j), & j \leq|\sigma|: \forall x<\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma): \\ & (T(e(j), x, \sigma) \wedge S(e(j), x, \sigma)=\sigma(x)) \\ \operatorname{patch}_{0}(\sigma), & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

To show that $h$ converges on all $g \in \mathbf{P F}$ : Let $g \in \mathbf{P F}$. Let $j_{0}$ be minimal such that $\varphi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}=g$. Let $p$ be a polynomial such that $\forall x: \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq p(|x|)$. We then have the following.
$-\forall^{\infty} n, j_{0} \leq n \leq|g[n]|$ (by (11)).

- $\forall^{\infty} n \forall j<j_{0}: g[n] \nsubseteq \varphi_{e(j)}$ (as $j_{0}$ minimal such that $\varphi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}=g$ ).
- We have $\forall^{\infty} x: \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq x{ }^{13}$ Hence, $\forall^{\infty} n \forall x \leq n: \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq n 114$ Therefore, using (11), $\forall^{\infty} n \forall x<n: T\left(e\left(j_{0}\right), x, g[n]\right)$; hence, also $\forall^{\infty} n \forall x<n$ : $S\left(e\left(j_{0}\right), x, g[n]\right)=\varphi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x)=g(x)$.

By the three items above, we have $\forall^{\infty} n: h(g[n])=e\left(j_{0}\right)$. Let $f=\lambda \sigma \cdot \underline{0}$. Obviously, $\langle h, f\rangle$ witnesses $\mathbf{P F} \in \mathbf{P c p}_{\underline{0}} \mathbf{E x}$. The furthermore clause follows from the choice of $e$ and patch ${ }_{0}$.

[^8]We will not give proofs for (b) and (c), as they are only slight modifications of the proof for (a). Note that (a) and (b) are both special cases of (c).

## Theorem 5

(a) $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}: \mathbf{E X P F} \notin \mathbf{P F P c p}_{n} \mathbf{E x}$.
(b) $\forall k, n \in \mathbb{N}: \mathbf{E X P}_{k+1} \mathbf{F} \notin \mathbf{P F}_{\overline{\mathbf{F}}}^{\mathbf{P}} \mathbf{p}_{w \cdot k+\underline{n}} \mathbf{E x}$.

We will not prove (b), but only its simpler to prove special case (a).
Proof of (a). Suppose by way of contradiction otherwise as witnessed by $n$ and $\langle h, f\rangle$. Note that $\{\sigma \mid \exists g \in \mathbf{E X P F}, \sigma \subset g\}=$ Seq; thus, $\langle h, f\rangle \in \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{\underline{n}}$.

Define $g \in \mathcal{R}$ according to the following informal definition in stages. $g_{s}$ denotes $g$ as defined until before stage $s$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& g_{0}=\varepsilon \\
& \text { stage } s=0 \text { to } \infty \\
& \text { if } h\left(g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right)=h\left(g_{s}\right) \\
& \text { then } g_{s+1}=g_{s} \diamond \overline{1} \diamond \overline{0}^{n} \\
& \quad \text { else } g_{s+1}
\end{aligned}=g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n} .4 .
$$

Claim 1: $h$ does not converge on $g$.
We show the claim by showing $\forall s: h\left(g_{s+1}\right) \neq h\left(g_{s}\right)$. As $\langle h, f\rangle \in \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{\underline{n}}$, we have for all $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and each $j \in\{0,1\}, \lambda i \leq n \cdot f\left(g_{s} \diamond \bar{j} \diamond \overline{0}^{i}\right)$ is not a $\underline{n}$-path, as there is no path of length $n+1$ in $\underline{n}$; hence, $\varphi_{h\left(g_{s} \diamond \bar{j} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)=j$.

If now $h\left(g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right)=h\left(g_{s}\right)$, then $\varphi_{h\left(g_{s+1}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)=$ $\varphi_{h\left(g_{s} \diamond 1 \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)=1 \neq \overline{0}=\varphi_{h\left(g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)=\varphi_{h\left(g_{s}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)$; thus, $h\left(g_{s+1}\right) \neq h\left(g_{s}\right)$.

If $h\left(g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right) \neq h\left(g_{s}\right)$, then $h\left(g_{s+1}\right)=h\left(g_{s} \diamond \overline{0} \diamond \overline{0}^{n}\right) \neq h\left(g_{s}\right)$.
$\square($ OF CLAIM 1$)$

## Claim 2: $g \in$ EXPF.

By the construction of $g$, we have $\forall s: g_{s} \in\{0,1\}^{s \cdot(n+1)}$. Hence, to compute $g(x)$ for any given $x$, it suffices to execute stages 0 through $x$ of the above algorithm to get $g_{x+1}$, from which $g(x)$ can then be extracted. Therefore, it suffices to show that, for all $s$, the stages 0 through $s$ of the above algorithm can be done with an appropriate timebound.

Let $p$ be a polynomial upper-bounding the runtime of $h$ such that $\forall x: x \leq$ $p(x)$. For any stage $s$, the time to execute stage $s$ is in $\mathcal{O}\left(\lambda s . p\left(\left|g_{s} \diamond \overline{0}^{n+1}\right|\right)+\right.$ $\left.p\left(\left|g_{s}\right|\right)\right)=\mathcal{O}\left(\lambda s . p\left(\left|g_{s}\right|+n+1\right)\right)=15 \mathcal{O}(\lambda s . p(s \cdot(n+1)+n+1))=\mathcal{O}(\lambda s . p(s))$. Therefore, for all $s$, the time to execute all stages 0 to $s$ is bounded above by $\mathcal{O}(\lambda s .(s+1) \cdot p(s)) \subseteq \mathcal{O}\left(\lambda s .2^{p^{\prime}(|s|)}\right)$ for some polynomial $p^{\prime}{ }^{16}$
$\square$ (of Claim 2)
$\square(\mathrm{OF}(\mathrm{a}))$
$\overline{15} \mathcal{O}\left(\left|g_{s}\right|\right)=\mathcal{O}\left(\# \operatorname{lets}\left(g_{s}\right)\right)$.
${ }^{16}$ Find $k$ such that $\mathcal{O}(p)=\mathcal{O}\left(\lambda x \cdot x^{k}\right)$. By [RC94 $\left.\S 2.5,(9)\right]$, there are $a, b$ such that
$x \leq a \cdot 2^{|x|}+b$. Thus, there is are $c, d, c^{\prime}, d^{\prime}$ such that $\forall x: p(x) \leq c \cdot x^{k}+d \leq$
$c \cdot\left(a \cdot 2^{|x|}+b\right)^{k}+d \leq c^{\prime} \cdot 2^{k \cdot|x|}+d^{\prime}$.

## 4 General Results

### 4.1 Results Mostly Not Comparing Graphs

The following theorem shows the relationship between the different learning criteria as defined in this paper.

Theorem 6. We have the following.

$$
\begin{gather*}
\forall G \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}: \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}=\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c s}_{G} \mathbf{E x} .  \tag{8}\\
\mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c s}_{\emptyset} \mathbf{E x} \backslash\left(\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}\right) \neq \emptyset .  \tag{9}\\
\mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c p}_{\emptyset} \mathbf{E x} \backslash\left(\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}\right) \neq \emptyset .  \tag{10}\\
\mathbf{P c p}_{\emptyset} \mathbf{E x} \backslash\left(\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}} \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c s}_{G} \mathbf{E x}\right) \neq \emptyset . \tag{11}
\end{gather*}
$$

Furthermore, the separations (9) and (10) are witnessed by sets of functions such that the positive part of the separation is witnessed by a (fair) learner computable in linear time working transductively.
Our proof of (8) above is an extension of Fulk's proof of the $G=\emptyset$ case Ful88.
Proof of (10). 17 Let $\mathcal{S}:=\left\{g \in \mathcal{R} \mid\left(\overline{0} \diamond\left(\pi_{1} \circ g\right), g\right) \in \mathbf{P c p}_{\emptyset} \mathbf{E x}\right\}$. Obviously, $\mathcal{S} \in \operatorname{LinFTdPcp} \boldsymbol{\eta}_{\emptyset} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c p}_{\emptyset}$ Ex. Let $G \in \mathcal{G}$. Suppose, by way of contradiction, $\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}$ as witnessed by $\left\langle h_{0}, f_{0}\right\rangle$. Define, for all $e \in \mathbb{N}$, $S_{e}:=\left\{\sigma \mid \forall i<\# \operatorname{elets}(\sigma): \pi_{1}\left(\pi_{1}(\sigma(i))\right)=e\right\}$. Note that $S_{e}$ is uniformly computable in $e$. By KRT, there is $e$ such that $\varphi_{e}$ is defined as the union over an infinite, with respect to sequence-extension strictly increasing, family of finite sequences $\left(\sigma_{s}\right)_{s \in \mathbb{N}}$ recursively specified as follows.

$$
\begin{align*}
\sigma_{0} & :=\emptyset  \tag{12}\\
\forall s: \sigma_{s+1} & :=\mu \sigma \in S_{e} \cdot \sigma_{s} \subset \sigma \wedge h_{0}(\sigma) \neq h_{0}\left(\sigma_{s}\right) \tag{13}
\end{align*}
$$

We reason by induction that, for all $s, \sigma_{s}$ is defined. Clear for $\sigma_{0}$. Let $s$ be such that $\sigma_{s}$ is defined. Let $\tau, \tau^{\prime} \in S_{e}$ be two extensions of $\sigma_{s}$ such that $\tau$ and $\tau^{\prime}$ differ at position $\# \operatorname{elets}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)$ (the first position not in $\sigma_{s}$ ), and \#elets $\left(\sigma_{s}\right)$ is in the bottomed-out set of $f_{0}$ after $f_{0}$ gets any one of the sequences $\tau$ or $\tau^{\prime}$ as input. Then, as $\left\langle h_{0}, f_{0}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G}, \varphi_{h_{0}(\tau)}\left(\# \operatorname{lets}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)\right)=\tau\left(\# \operatorname{lets}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)\right) \neq$ $\tau^{\prime}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)\right)=\varphi_{h_{0}\left(\tau^{\prime}\right)}\left(\# \operatorname{elets}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)\right)$. Hence, for at least one $\sigma \in\left\{\tau, \tau^{\prime}\right\}, h_{0}(\sigma) \neq$ $h_{0}\left(\sigma_{s}\right)$.

We have a contradiction, as trivially $\varphi_{e} \in \mathcal{S}$ and $\left\langle h_{0}, f_{0}\right\rangle$ does not $\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G}$ Exidentify $\varphi_{e}$.
$\square$ (FOR (10))

[^9]Theorem 7. Let $G \in \mathcal{G}$. Then $\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}$ is closed under computably enumerable unions.

Our proof for Theorem 7 makes use of the notion of reliability [Min76, BB75].
Theorem 8. We have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \mathbf{P c s}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subset \mathbf{E x} . \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Furthermore, the separation is witnessed by a (fair) learner computable in linear time working transductively.

### 4.2 Dependencies on the Countdown Graphs

Next we define a pre-order, $\leq_{C D}$, on $\mathcal{G}$. We will see that $\leq_{C D}$ characterizes relative learning-power in dependence on countdown graphs.

Definition 9. For two graphs $G, G^{\prime}$ we write $G \leq_{C D} G^{\prime}$ (read: $G$ is countdown reducible to $G^{\prime}$ ) iff there is a $k \in \mathcal{R}$, such that
(i) for all $y \in G: k(\bar{y}) \in G^{\prime}$;
(ii) for all $\tau \diamond \bar{y} \in \vec{G}$ such that $\# \operatorname{elets}(\tau)>0$, we have $k(\tau) \rightarrow_{G^{\prime}} k(\tau \diamond \bar{y})$.

Intuitively, $k$ maps any $G$-path into a vertex of $G^{\prime} 18$ Clearly, $\leq_{C D}$ is a pre-order.
Proposition 10. Let $G, G^{\prime} \in \mathcal{G}$. Let $k \in \mathcal{R}$. The following are equivalent.
(a) $G \leq_{C D} G^{\prime}$ as witnessed by $k$;
(b) $\forall \tau \in \vec{G}:(\lambda i<\# \operatorname{elets}(\tau) . k(\tau[i+1])) \in \overrightarrow{G^{\prime}}$.

Next we exhibit nice example countdown graphs and indicate how they compare by $\leq_{C D}$.
$\omega$ denotes the order-type of the natural numbers ordered by $\leq, \omega^{-1}$ denotes the order-type of the natural numbers ordered by $\geq$.

Theorem 11. There is a computable total ordering $\leq_{R}$ on $\mathbb{N}$ of order-type $\omega+\omega^{-1}$ such that there are no computable infinitely descending chains with respect to $\leq_{R}$; hence, $\left(\mathbb{N},>_{R}\right)$ is a countdown graph.

For the rest of this section, let $\leq_{R}$ be as in Theorem 11 and let $R$ denote the countdown graph $\left(\mathbb{N},>_{R}\right)$.

Example 12. Let $(\mathcal{N}, \leq \mathcal{N}),\left(\mathcal{N}^{\prime}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}^{\prime}}\right)$ be computably related systems of ordinal notations. Then we have
(a) $\mathcal{N} \leq{ }_{C D} \mathcal{N}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mathcal{N}^{\prime}$ gives a notation to at least all the ordinals $\mathcal{N}$ gives a notation to;

[^10](b) $\mathcal{N} \leq C D R \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{N}$ gives a notation to all and only the ordinals $<\omega \cdot i+j$ for some $i \in\{0,1\}, j \in \mathbb{N}$; and
(c) $R \not \not_{C D} \mathcal{N}$.

Theorem 13. Let $G \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}, G^{\prime} \in \mathcal{G}$. We have

$$
\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x} \Leftrightarrow G \leq_{C D} G^{\prime}
$$

Next are three corollaries to Theorem 13 (or its proof). The first two are regarding the other restricted learnability notions of the present paper. The third is our hierarchy theorem for ordinal notations.

Corollary 14. Let $G \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}$. We have

$$
\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \backslash \bigcup_{\substack{G^{\prime} \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }} \\ G \mathbb{Z}_{C D} G^{\prime}}} \operatorname{Pcs}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x} \neq \emptyset .
$$

Next is a characterization of the graph dependence of relative learning power for the restricted learning criteria not covered by Theorem 13 ,

Corollary 15. For all $G, G^{\prime} \in \mathcal{G}_{\text {comp }}$ we have

$$
\begin{align*}
G \leq_{C D} G^{\prime} & \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c p}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x}  \tag{15}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c s}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c s}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x}  \tag{16}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathbf{P c p}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x}  \tag{17}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{P c s}_{G} \mathbf{E x} \subseteq \mathbf{P c s}_{G^{\prime}} \mathbf{E x} . \tag{18}
\end{align*}
$$

Recall that, from Section 2, for a graph $G \in \mathcal{G}$ and $m \in G$, we ambiguously use $m$ to refer to the countdown-graph $\left\{n \in G \mid m \rightarrow^{+} n\right\}$. For two sets $M, N$ we write $M \# N$ iff $(M \nsubseteq N \wedge N \nsubseteq M)$.

Corollary 16. Let $\left(\mathcal{N}, \leq_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ be a computably related system of ordinal notations. Let $u, v \in \mathcal{N}$. Then we have

$$
\begin{align*}
u<_{\mathcal{N}} v & \Leftrightarrow u<_{C D} v  \tag{19}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{u} \mathbf{E x} \subset \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{v} \mathbf{E x} . \tag{20}
\end{align*}
$$

Furthermore, if $\mathcal{N}$ gives a notation to at least all ordinals $<\omega \cdot 2$, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{\mathcal{N}} \mathbf{E x} \# \mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{R} \mathbf{E x} \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ We use the terminology postdictive completeness because the the hypotheses must completely postdict the data seen to that point. We use the terminology postdictive consistency because the the hypotheses need only avoid explicit inconsistencies with the data seen to that point. Such an hypothesis may, then, on some input for which the data seen to that point tells the answer, go undefined (i.e., go into an infinite loop) and, thereby, not explicitly contradict the known data. In the literature on these requirements, except for [Ful88, what we call postdictively complete is called consistent, and what we call postdictively consistent is called conformal.
    ${ }^{2}$ Note that, for $n=0$, the data seen is empty and the output hypothesis, $p_{0}$, is unconstrained.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ Below we refer to a vector of such individual counts as a multicount.
    ${ }^{4}$ Pitt talks in this context of delaying tricks. We changed this terminology due to the clash with Akama and Zeugmann's terminology for delayed postdictive completeness.

[^2]:    ${ }^{5}$ The dyadic representation of a natural number $x:=$ the $x$-th finite string over $\{0,1\}$ in lexicographical order, where the counting of strings starts with zero RC94. Hence, unlike with binary representation, lead zeros matter.
    ${ }^{6}$ This convention about $|\varepsilon|=1$ helps with runtime considerations.

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ This numerical coding guarantees that many simple operations involving the coding run in linear time. This is by contrast with historically more typical codings featuring prime powers and corresponding at least exponential costs to do simple things.

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ For these $\mathcal{O}$-formulas, $|\varepsilon|=1$ helps.

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ Thus, every sequence acceptance criterion denotes at the same time a learning criterion and the set of learnable sets. It will be clear from context which meaning is intended. An example: Ex, then, denotes sequence acceptance criterion $\mathbf{E x}$, learning criterion ( $\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{E x}$ ) and set $\mathcal{P} \mathbf{E x}$ of $(\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{E x})$-learnable sets.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ Of course, $\sigma(i) \in \mathbb{S e q}$ means that the number $\sigma(i)$ is the code of a sequence.

[^7]:    ${ }^{11}$ Specific systems of ordinal notations seen in the literature typically, perhaps always, satisfy (3).

[^8]:    ${ }^{12}$ N.B. $S$ and $T$ above are variants of the $S$ and $T$ featured in RC94 Corollary 3.7].
    ${ }^{13}$ By RC94, §2.5, (9)], there are $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall x: 2^{|x|} \leq a \cdot x+b$; thus, there is $d>0$ such that $\forall^{\infty} x: 2^{|x|} \leq d \cdot x$. Clearly, $\forall^{\infty} x: p(|x|) \leq \frac{1}{d} 2^{|x|}$. Thus, $\forall^{\infty} x: p(|x|) \leq x$.
    ${ }^{14}$ Let $n_{0}, n_{1}$ be such that $\forall x \geq n_{0}: \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq x$ and $\forall x<n_{0}: \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq n_{1}$. Then, for all $n \geq \max \left\{n_{0}, n_{1}\right\}$ and for all $x \leq n$, we have (if $\left.x<n_{0}\right) \Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq n_{1} \leq n$, and (otherwise) $\Phi_{e\left(j_{0}\right)}(x) \leq x \leq n$.

[^9]:    ${ }^{17}$ An anonymous referee pointed out that (10) can be proven by showing that all sets in $\mathcal{T} \mathbf{P c p}_{G} \mathbf{E x}$ can be reliably learned, as it is known that not all reliably learnable sets are $\mathcal{R} \mathbf{P c p}_{\emptyset}$ Ex-learnable CJSW04. We give this proof as a particularly short examplar of many proofs omitted in Section 4

[^10]:    ${ }^{18}$ Neither of mapping $G$ vertices into $G^{\prime}$ vertices nor mapping $G$ paths into $G^{\prime}$ paths will give us the same characterization results that we have in Theorem 13 below.

