

# Data-Driven Decision-Making In Enterprise Applications

## Dynamic Pricing in Competitive Markets

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# Outline

- Recall Dynamic Programming
  - Selling Airline Seats
  - Knapsack Problem
- Simulation of Competitive Markets
  - Simple approaches to model Customer Choice
  - Simulation of Customer Decisions
  - Simulation of mutual Price Responses

# General Dynamic Programming Framework

- $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T$       Time periods
- $s \in S_t$       States (at time  $t$ )
- $a \in A_t(s)$       Actions (at time  $t$  in state  $s$ )
- $i \in I_t(a, s)$       Potential Events (at time  $t$  in state  $s$  under action  $a$ )
- $P_t(i, a, s)$       Event Probabilities (for event  $i$  at  $t$  in  $s$  under  $a$ )
- $R_t(i, a, s)$       Reward Function (for event  $i$  at  $t$  in  $s$  under  $a$ )
- $\Gamma_t(i, a, s)$       State Transitions (from  $s$  to new state)
- Solution:      Recursive Solution Principle (Bellman Equation)

# General Solution Approach (Bellman Equation)

- $V_t(s)$  Value function: “Best expected discounted future rewards in  $(t,s)$ ”
- $V_T(s) \stackrel{e.g.}{:=} 0$  Terminal condition for all  $s \in S_T$
- Recursive computation of the Value function,  $\forall s \in S_t, t = 0, \dots, T-1,$

$$V_t(s) = \max_{a \in A_t(s)} \left\{ \sum_{i \in I_t(a,s)} \underbrace{P(i,a,s)}_{\text{probability}} \cdot \left( \underbrace{R_t(i,a,s)}_{\text{today's reward}} + \underbrace{\delta \cdot V_{t+1}(\Gamma_t(i,a,s))}_{\text{best disc. exp. future reward of new state}} \right) \right\}$$

- The optimal strategy  $a_t^*(s) := \arg \max_{a \in A_t(s)} \{ \dots \}, \forall s \in S_t, t = 0, \dots, T-1,$

## Example I: Selling Airline Tickets (Monopoly)

- $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T$  Time points and periods  $(t, t+1)$
- $s \in S_t$  **Number of tickets left** (at time  $t$ )  $S := \{0, 1, \dots, N\}$
- $a \in A_t(s)$  **Offer price** (at period  $(t, t+1)$  in state  $s$ )  $A := \{10, 20, \dots, 500\}$
- $i \in I_t(a, s)$  **Number of requested tickets (Demand)**  $I := \{0, 1, \dots\}$
- $P_t(i, a, s)$  **Sales probabilities** (for  $i$  tickets at in period  $t$  at price  $a$ )
- $R_t(i, a, s)$  Reward function:  $R(i, a, s) := a \cdot \min(i, s)$  (**Profits**)
- $\Gamma_t(i, a, s)$  State transitions:  $\Gamma(i, s) := \max(0, s - i)$  (**Items left**)
- Solution: Recursive Solution Principle (Bellman Equation)

## Example II: Knapsack Problem

- $V_t(s)$  Best utility of “from item set  $\{t, \dots, T\}$  and capacity  $s$ ”
- $t = 1, 2, \dots, T + 1$  **Consider sets of items**  $\{t, \dots, T\}$  ( $T=N$  total items)
- $s \in \{0, 1, \dots, C\}$  **State: Potential capacity left** (max capacity  $C$ )
- $a \in A_t(s) := \{0, 1_{\{c_t \leq s\}}\}$  **Whether to take item  $t$**  (if the item fits)
- $i \in I_t(a, s), P_t(i, a, s)$  *No random events (deterministic problem)*
- $R_t(a, s)$  Reward function:  $R_t(a) := a \cdot u_t$  (**utility of item  $t$** )
- $\Gamma_t(a, s)$  New state:  $\Gamma_t(a, s) := s - a \cdot c_t$  (**remaining capacity**)

# DP Solution for the Knapsack Problem

- $V_t(s)$  Best utility of “having the item set  $\{t, \dots, T\}$  and capacity  $s$ ”
- $V_{T+1}(s) := 0$  Terminal condition for all  $s \in \{0, \dots, C\}$
- Recursive computation of the Value function,  $\forall s \in S_t, t = 0, \dots, T - 1,$
- $$V_t(s) = \max_{a \in \{0, 1\}_{\{c_t \leq s\}}} \left\{ \underbrace{a \cdot u_t}_{\text{utility item } t} + \underbrace{\delta \cdot V_{t+1}(s - a \cdot c_t)}_{\text{best utility of item set } \{t+1, \dots, T\} \text{ with new capacity}} \right\}$$
- Exercise: Reconstruct the optimal strategy  $a_t^*(C), t = 1, \dots, T,$


## II Simulation of Competitive Markets



# Motivation Pricing Competition

- Big picture: Modelling dynamic pricing competition
- Separable components: Customers, Markets, Merchants
- How to describe *Customer Behavior*?
- We look for a general model which is simple yet reasonable
- How do you decide?

# Example: Buying Books on Amazon



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**EUR 65,60**

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**Gebraucht - Wie neu**

New, Excellent customer service. Satisfaction guaranteed!!

**Totalbookstore**

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Publisher: Springer<br>Date of Publication: 2014<br>Binding: hard... » [Weitere Informationen](#)

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- **Ankunft zwischen** Mai 2-6.
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# Customer Choice based on a given Market Situation

seller	price	quality	rating	feedback	shipping
$k$	$p_k$	$q_k$	$r_k$	$f_k$	$c_k$
1	<b>44.90</b>	<b>akzeptabel</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5 Tage</b>
2	45.00	sehr gut	98%	<b>28,584</b>	6 Tage
3	65.60	<b>wie neu</b>	<b>89%</b>	439	<b>11 Tage</b>
4	<b>79.56</b>	sehr gut	90%	338	10 Tage
...					
$K$			...		

# Simulate Strategic Interaction in Competitive Markets

- Task: Understand & describe customers' decisions over time
- Assume: A product with multiple features (price, quality, ratings)  
A list of competitors' offers (market situation)  
Stream of interested customers + buying decisions
- Goal: Simulate arriving customer and their buying decision  
given a simulated set of competitors' offers

## (1) Stream of Arriving Customer

- Any ideas?
- Simulate random delays (waiting times) between two customers
- Use, e.g., *Uniform distributions* or *Exponential distributions*
- Is this doable?

## (2) Merchants' Offers & Market Situations

- Simulate offers, i.e., random numbers for prices, quality, ratings

seller $k$	price $p_k$	quality $q_k$	rating $r_k$
1	<b>44.90</b>	<b>akzeptabel (4)</b>	<b>100%</b>
2	45.00	sehr gut (2)	98%
3	65.60	<b>wie neu (1)</b>	<b>89%</b>
4	<b>79.56</b>	sehr gut (2)	90%
...			
$K$			...

### (3) Customers' Decision

- Assume: A customer arrives at time  $t$  – how does he/she decide?
- Approach I: Always choose the cheapest offer
- Approach II: Use distribution of sales and price rank
- Approach III: Use (randomized) scoring functions
- Other: Combinations, data-driven, etc.

## Approach I: Cheapest Offer

- Idea: An interested customer always chooses the **cheapest offer**
- Easy / deterministic?
- In case of identical prices use probabilities:

$$P(k, \vec{s}) = P(k, \vec{p}, \dots) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\left| \left\{ k = 1, \dots, K : p_k = \min_{i=1, \dots, K} p_i \right\} \right|} & , k = 1, \dots, K : p_k = \min_{i=1, \dots, K} p_i \\ 0 & , k = 1, \dots, K : p_k > \min_{i=1, \dots, K} p_i \end{cases}$$



## Approach II: Sales vs. Price Rank

- Idea: Relative frequency of sales and **price ranks**
- Example: 100 sales  $\rightarrow$  #60 rank 1, #30 rank 2, #10 rank 3, . . .  
i.e.,  $H$  sales -  $h_1=60$ ,  $h_2=30$ ,  $h_3=10$ , . . .
- Simulate the buying probability  $P(k, \vec{s})$  that rank  $k$  is chosen,  $k = 1, \dots, K$

where

$$P(k, \vec{s}) = P(k, \vec{p}, \dots) = \frac{h_{\text{rank}(p_k, \vec{p})}}{\sum_{i=1, \dots, K} h_i}$$

## Approach III: Randomized Scoring

- Idea: Different customers use different **scoring functions**
- Customer Type 1:  $\arg \min_{k=1,\dots,K} \{p_k + 0.1 \cdot q_k - 0.01 \cdot r_k - 0.01 \cdot f_k^{0.5}\}$
- Customer Type 2:  $\arg \min_{k=1,\dots,K} \{p_k + 0.15 \cdot q_k - 0.005 \cdot r_k - 0.03 \cdot f_k^{0.5}\}$
- Customer Type 3:  $\arg \min_{k=1,\dots,K} \{p_k + 0.2 \cdot q_k - 0.05 \cdot r_k - 0.02 \cdot f_k^{0.5}\}$
- ...
- We can model the decision of a random customer as follows:

$$\arg \min_{k=1,\dots,K} \{p_k + U(0,0.2) \cdot q_k - U(0,0.1) \cdot r_k - U(0,0.05) \cdot f_k^{0.5}\}$$

# How to Simulate Customer Choice?

- We need: Realisations of (stochastic) buying behavior for various market situations in our models
- Approach I+II: “*Inverse Verteilungsmethode* for  $P(k, \vec{s})$  via  $U(0,1)$ ”
- Approach III:
  - simulate random scoring coefficients, e.g.,  $U(0,0.05)$
  - compute scores for all  $K$  offers
  - choose the offer with the best score
- Do you think you can do this?

## (4) Combination: Arriving and Buying Customers

- Assume a generated (current) market situation
- Simulate arriving customers over time
- Simulate customers' individual decisions
- Doable?

## (5) Extensions: Changing Market Situations

- (i) Entry / Exit of firms
- (ii) Price adjustments
- Simulate streams of points in time of the merchants' actions (“arrivals”)
- Doable?

## (6) Demand Learning

- Idea: explain the „dependent variable“ by „explanatory variables“
- „Dependent variable“:      number of sales  $y$  (of our firm within periods)
- „Explanatory variables“:    price rank  $r$   
   price difference to best competitor's price  
   ratings, shipping time, . . .
- Remember: Derive the  $\beta^*$  – coefficients for every explanatory variable by  
   linear/logistic regression
- Doable?

## (7) Response Strategies

- Assume a merchant can place his/her action at time  $t$
- Apply a rule-based price reaction strategy
  - (i) Use a random price
  - (ii) Undercut the cheapest competitor price
  - (iii) Undercut others or raise the price if prices are too cheap
  - (iv) Maximize short-term profit
- Doable?

## Potential Projects

- (1) Index Selection (LP)
- (2) Data Placement Problems (LP)
- (3) Oligopoly Market Simulation with focus:  
Demand Learning (ML) and/or Pricing (DP) and/or Ordering (DP)
- (4) Duopoly Competition + Response Strategies (DP)
- (5) Own Suggestions

Group Homework: Linear Programming / Dynamic Programming



## Project Goals (Teams of 2 – 4)

- Understand & describe your decision problem
- Derive solution approaches
- Apply learned optimization concepts & implement solution
- Simulate results & measure performance
- Presentation: Problem, approach, and early results
- Documentation: Summary of what has been done (until Aug 31)

# Overview

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1	April 27/30	Introduction + Linear Programming
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9	June 22/25	Work on Projects: Input/Support
10	June 29/2	Work on Projects: Input/Support
11	July 6/9	Work on Projects: Input/Support
12	July 13/16	Work on Projects: Input/Support
13	July/Aug	Finish Documentation (Deadline: Aug 31)

# (1) Index Selection

# (1) Index Selection

Indexes can speed up the execution of queries.

But – indexes require memory and memory is limited.

Further, the impact of indexes is coupled:

The “best” indexes might not form the best selection!

What is “*index interaction*” (IIA)?

➔ The world’s best players  
do not form the best team!



# (1) Index Selection – Problem Description

**Context:** Assume queries with different involved attributes (columns).  
Suitable indexes can speed up queries, but require memory.

**Decisions:** Which *subset* of potential indexes to store?

Note, sets of index candidates and combinations are enormous

**Impact:**

- (i) What-if optimizer based costs (*no cost model!*)
- (ii) Index interaction! (an index' utility is affected by others)

**Constraints:** Memory for indexes has a given limit (budget constraint)

**Objective:** *Minimize runtime s.t. the budget constraint*

# (1) Index Selection – LP Formulation

Objective:            minimize: Expected runtime            (linear)

- s.t.
- one index decision only for each query  $j=1,\dots,Q$
  - index  $i$  used at all?
  - budget constraint

Extensions:        Stochastic workloads

Robust decisions

## (2) Partial Replication


## (2) Data Placement for Replication

If the workload exceeds a database's capabilities *replicas* are used (scale-out).

We consider large *read-only* analytical workloads.

Workload can be distributed – but, storing data on replicas is costly!

How can we help the DBA to *balance* workloads with *minimal replicated data*?





## (2) Data Placement for Replication

**Context:** Assume analytical read-only queries using different data fragments.

Workload is generated by queries (frequencies  $\times$  costs).

Replica nodes take load from the master node.

**Decisions:** (i) which fragments to put on which replica (data placement)  
(ii) which replica shall run which share of a query's workload

**Impact:** Deterministic


**Constraints:** (i) *Balance workload **evenly** on replicas*

(ii) To run a query on a replica *all* data fragments are needed

**Objective:** ***Minimize** costs of replicas (sum of required replicated data)*

## (2) Solution Approach: LP-Based Decomposition

*Optimization:* LP-based decomposition (with scalable sub-problems)




Extensions: Stochastic workloads

Robust decisions

## (3) Markets & Demand Learning

# (3) Market Simulation & Demand Learning

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How can we assist an e-commerce merchant in optimizing his/her prices?

### (3) Problem Description

**Use-Case:** A large merchant sells used books on Amazon Marketplace

**Context:**

- (i) Many distinct items (ISBN), no reordering
- (ii) Active competitors, changing environments
- (iii) Multiple offer dimensions (quality, ratings, etc.)

**Objective:** Optimize expected profits & balance profitability vs. speed of sales


**Decisions:** Price updates

**Impact:** Effects of price updates **have to be estimated** from market data

**Constraints:** Limited inventory, limited price updates/hour


### (3) Problem Description

- Characteristics:
- Exits & entries of competitors
  - Active and passive competitors
  - Price cycles



### (3) Process

- Price update process on Amazon: (i) request a market situation (ii) optimize price based on demand model, (iii) send price update



### (3) Estimation of Demand and Optimization

#### (1) Estimation of Sales Probabilities

- ca. 10 market situations/day/item with 1-20 firms (100 Mio obs.)
- ca. 2 000 sales/month (1 year of data)
- Predict sales probabilities (for time intervals and market situations)

#### (2) *Price Optimization*


- Maximize expected discounted long-term profit
- Dynamic programming (with relaxed market anticipations)
- Computation time: should be fast



## (4) Duopoly Competition


# (4) Duopoly Competition & Response Strategies

Question: How do *optimal* price adjustment strategies look like?




Setting: Infinite horizon, competitor's response strategy *is known*

Results:





against  $F(a) := \max(a-1, 1)$



mutual optimal (equilibrium)


## (4) Interaction of Self-Adapting Strategies (Short-Term)

- Now, price responses *have to be learned!*
- Both players update their strategies
- Do equilibria exist?




## (4) Interaction of Self-Adapting Strategies (Long-Term)

- Now, price responses *have to be learned!*
- Both players update their strategies
- Equilibria in *mixed* strategies



*long-term price reactions*



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