- Billy Jin and David Williamson. Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model
- Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel and Noam Nisan. Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis
- Zhaohua Chen and Guang Yang. Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary
- Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre. Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
- Vineet Goyal, Garud Iyengar and Rajan Udwani. Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable Resources
- Uriel Feige, Ariel Sapir and Laliv Tauber. A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations
- Siddharth Barman and Paritosh Verma. Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations
- Naonori Kakimura and Donghao Zhu. Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures
- Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Alexandros Voudouris. The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice
- Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil Devanur and Thodoris Lykouris. Static pricing for multi-unit prophet inequalities
- Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró and Tamás Fleiner. The core of housing markets from an agent’s perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Sigal Oren and Oren Roth. Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
- Will Ma, Pan Xu and Yifan Xu. Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets
- Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker and Warut Suksompong. Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule (Best Student Paper)
- Shih-Tang Su, Vijay Subramanian and Grant Schoenebeck. Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
- Jing Chen and Bo Li. Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries
- Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla and S. Matthew Weinberg. Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
- Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt and Alex Smolin. The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing
- Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe and Robert Kleinberg. Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy
- Ayumi Igarashi and Frederic Meunier. Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes
- Zhi Chen, Zhenyu Hu and Ruiqin Wang. Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and A Geometric Approach
- Ido Feldman and Ron Lavi. Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post vs. Ex-Interim IR
- Pál András Papp and Roger Wattenhofer. Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem
- Xi Chen, Christian Kroer and Rachitesh Kumar. Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets
- Ioannis Caragiannis and Stavros Ioannidis. Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
- Tobias Harks and Julian Schwarz. Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Mixed-Integer Variables
- Meryem Essaidi and S. Matthew Weinberg. On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
- Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria and Jiaqi Lu. When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?
- Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David Parkes and Eric Sodomka. Welfare-Preserving $\varepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
- Dimitris Fotakis and Panagiotis Patsilinakos. Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances
- Nicole Immorlica, Wanyi Li and Brendan Lucier. Contract Design for Afforestation Programs
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikolai Gravin, Pinyan Lu and Zihe Wang. Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posting pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
- Sigal Oren and Nadav Sklar. Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias
- Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg. Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
- Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness (Best Paper)
- Christos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli and Mihalis Yannakakis. The Platform Design Problem
- Yonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara, Ilan Morgenstern and Daniela Saban. Confounding Equilibria for Platforms with Private Information on Promotion Value
- Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira and Amy Greenwald. Tâtonnement beyond Constant Elasticity of Substitution
- Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe and Vijay Subramanian. On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
- Mark York, Munther Dahleh and David C. Parkes. Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment
- Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa and Artem Tsikiridis. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
