Accepted Papers

  • Billy Jin and David Williamson. Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model
  • Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel and Noam Nisan. Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis
  • Zhaohua Chen and Guang Yang. Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary
  • Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre. Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
  • Vineet Goyal, Garud Iyengar and Rajan Udwani. Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable Resources
  • Uriel Feige, Ariel Sapir and Laliv Tauber. A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations
  • Siddharth Barman and Paritosh Verma. Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations
  • Naonori Kakimura and Donghao Zhu. Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures
  • Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Alexandros Voudouris. The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice
  • Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil Devanur and Thodoris Lykouris. Static pricing for multi-unit prophet inequalities
  • Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró and Tamás Fleiner. The core of housing markets from an agent’s perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
  • Sigal Oren and Oren Roth. Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
  • Will Ma, Pan Xu and Yifan Xu. Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets
  • Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker and Warut Suksompong. Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
  • Shih-Tang Su, Vijay Subramanian and Grant Schoenebeck. Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
  • Jing Chen and Bo Li. Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries
  • Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla and S. Matthew Weinberg. Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
  • Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt and Alex Smolin. The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing
  • Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe and Robert Kleinberg. Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy
  • Ayumi Igarashi and Frederic Meunier. Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes
  • Zhi Chen, Zhenyu Hu and Ruiqin Wang. Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and A Geometric Approach
  • Ido Feldman and Ron Lavi. Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post vs. Ex-Interim IR
  • Pál András Papp and Roger Wattenhofer. Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem
  • Xi Chen, Christian Kroer and Rachitesh Kumar. Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets
  • Ioannis Caragiannis and Stavros Ioannidis. Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
  • Tobias Harks and Julian Schwarz. Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Mixed-Integer Variables
  • Meryem Essaidi and S. Matthew Weinberg. On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
  • Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria and Jiaqi Lu. When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?
  • Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David Parkes and Eric Sodomka. Welfare-Preserving $\varepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
  • Dimitris Fotakis and Panagiotis Patsilinakos. Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances
  • Nicole Immorlica, Wanyi Li and Brendan Lucier. Contract Design for Afforestation Programs
  • Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikolai Gravin, Pinyan Lu and Zihe Wang. Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posting pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
  • Sigal Oren and Nadav Sklar. Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias
  • Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg. Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
  • Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
  • Christos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli and Mihalis Yannakakis. The Platform Design Problem
  • Yonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara, Ilan Morgenstern and Daniela Saban. Confounding Equilibria for Platforms with Private Information on Promotion Value
  • Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira and Amy Greenwald. Tâtonnement beyond Constant Elasticity of Substitution
  • Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe and Vijay Subramanian. On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
  • Mark York, Munther Dahleh and David C. Parkes. Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment
  • Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa and Artem Tsikiridis. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction