Accepted Posters

The list of accepted posters is out. If you submitted a paper, look out for decision notifications that include instructions for submitting the final version of accepted posters.

  • Manish Raghavan with Jon Kleinberg. Algorithmic Monoculture and Social Welfare
  • Jonas Israel with Aviram Imber, Markus Brill, Benny Kimelfeld. Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information
  • Denizalp Goktas with Amy Greenwald. Convex-Concave Min-Max Stackelberg Games
  • Yutong Wu with Ali Khodabakhsh, Bo Li, Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis. Eliciting Information with Partial Signals in Repeated Games
  • Ankang Sun with Bo Chen, Xuan Vinh Doan. Fairness Criteria for Allocating Indivisible Chores: Connections and Efficiencies
  • Nicholas Teh with Jonathan Scarlett, Yair Zick. For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
  • Neel Karia with Faraaz Mallick, Palash Dey. How Hard is Safe Bribery?
  • Tao Lin with Manon Revel, Daniel Halpern. How Many Representatives Do We Need? The Optimal Size of an Epistemic Congress
  • Billy Jin with David P. Williamson. Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model
  • Zhe Feng with Guru Guruganesh, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru Varadaraja. Learning to Bid in Contextual First Price Auctions
  • Andres Perlroth with Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh. Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries
  • Noah Burrell with Grant Schoenebeck. Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study
  • Xinyan Hu with Xiaotie Deng, Xinyan Hu, Tao Lin, Weiqiang Zheng. Nash Convergence of Mean-Based Learning Algorithms in First Price Auctions
  • Jannik Peters. Online Elicitation of Necessarily Optimal Matchings
  • Ruiqin Wang with Zhi Chen, Zhenyu Hu. Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and A Geometric Approach
  • Yao-Yun Chang with Po-Yang Wu, Po-An Chen, and Wing-Kai Hon. Selling User Data to No-Regret Advertisers via Dynamic Multi-Item Auctions
  • Divyarthi Mohan with Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Alexandros Psomas. Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions
  • Alexander Lam with Haris Aziz, Barton E. Lee, Toby Walsh. Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
  • Kiran Vodrahalli with Christos Papadimitriou, Mihalis Yannakakis. The Platform Design Problem
  • Artem Tsikiridis with Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
  • Diodato Ferraioli with Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre. Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality