2018

Chauhan, Ankit; Lenzner, Pascal; Molitor, Louise Schelling Segregation with Strategic AgentsSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2018
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ DOI ] [ Download ]
 
Schelling’s segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences. For our models we investigate the convergence behavior and the efficiency of their equilibria. In particular, we prove guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium in the version which is closest to Schelling’s original model. Moreover, we provide tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
@inproceedings{chauhan2018schelling, abstract = {Schelling’s segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences. For our models we investigate the convergence behavior and the efficiency of their equilibria. In particular, we prove guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium in the version which is closest to Schelling’s original model. Moreover, we provide tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy.}, author = {Chauhan, Ankit and Lenzner, Pascal and Molitor, Louise}, booktitle = {Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {ankitchauhan louisemolitor pascallenzner sagt year2018}, title = {Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents}, year = 2018 }

Cseh, Ágnes; Fleiner, Tamás The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal SharesSymposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2018: 19–30
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ URL ] [ DOI ]
 
An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. The problem of proportional cake cutting focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among n players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share. In this paper, we investigate the problem of proportional division with unequal shares, where each player is entitled to receive a predetermined portion of the cake. Our main contribution is threefold. First we present a protocol for integer demands that delivers a proportional solution in fewer queries than all known algorithms. Then we show that our protocol is asymptotically the fastest possible by giving a matching lower bound. Finally, we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cutting problem by reducing it to the same problem with integer demands only. All results remain valid in a highly general cake cutting model, which can be of independent interest.
@inproceedings{cseh2018complexity, abstract = {An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. The problem of proportional cake cutting focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among n players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share. In this paper, we investigate the problem of proportional division with unequal shares, where each player is entitled to receive a predetermined portion of the cake. Our main contribution is threefold. First we present a protocol for integer demands that delivers a proportional solution in fewer queries than all known algorithms. Then we show that our protocol is asymptotically the fastest possible by giving a matching lower bound. Finally, we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cutting problem by reducing it to the same problem with integer demands only. All results remain valid in a highly general cake cutting model, which can be of independent interest.}, author = {Cseh, Ágnes and Fleiner, Tamás}, booktitle = {Symposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {sys:relevantfor:ae agnescseh bestpaper sagt tamasfleiner year2018}, pages = {19-30}, title = {The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares}, year = 2018 }

2017

Chauhan, Ankit; Lenzner, Pascal; Melnichenko, Anna; Molitor, Louise Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge CostSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2017: 160–172
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ DOI ] [ Download ]
 
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC’03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these games. We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most general version of our model has con- stant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any network creation game.
@inproceedings{chauhan2017selfish, abstract = {Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC’03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these games. We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most general version of our model has con- stant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any network creation game.}, author = {Chauhan, Ankit and Lenzner, Pascal and Melnichenko, Anna and Molitor, Louise}, booktitle = {Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {ankitchauhan annamelnichenko louisemolitor pascallenzner sagt year2017}, pages = {160-172}, title = {Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost}, year = 2017 }

Friedrich, Tobias; Ihde, Sven; Keßler, Christoph; Lenzner, Pascal; Neubert, Stefan; Schumann, David Efficient Best Response Computation for Strategic Network Formation under AttackSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2017: 199–211
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ DOI ] [ Download ]
 
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being computationally intractable, i.e. computing a best response strategy or checking if an equilibrium is reached is NP-hard. Thus, a main challenge in the field is to find tractable realistic network formation models. We address this challenge by investigating a very recently introduced model by Goyal et al. [WINE'16] which focuses on robust networks in the presence of a strong adversary who attacks (and kills) nodes in the network and lets this attack spread virus-like to neighboring nodes and their neighbors. Our main result is to establish that this natural model is one of the few exceptions which are both realistic and computationally tractable. In particular, we answer an open question of Goyal et al. by providing an efficient algorithm for computing a best response strategy, which implies that deciding whether the game has reached a Nash equilibrium can be done efficiently as well. Our algorithm essentially solves the problem of computing a minimal connection to a network which maximizes the reachability while hedging against severe attacks on the network infrastructure and may thus be of independent interest.
@inproceedings{friedrich2017efficient, abstract = {Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being computationally intractable, i.e. computing a best response strategy or checking if an equilibrium is reached is NP-hard. Thus, a main challenge in the field is to find tractable realistic network formation models. We address this challenge by investigating a very recently introduced model by Goyal et al. [WINE'16] which focuses on robust networks in the presence of a strong adversary who attacks (and kills) nodes in the network and lets this attack spread virus-like to neighboring nodes and their neighbors. Our main result is to establish that this natural model is one of the few exceptions which are both realistic and computationally tractable. In particular, we answer an open question of Goyal et al. by providing an efficient algorithm for computing a best response strategy, which implies that deciding whether the game has reached a Nash equilibrium can be done efficiently as well. Our algorithm essentially solves the problem of computing a minimal connection to a network which maximizes the reachability while hedging against severe attacks on the network infrastructure and may thus be of independent interest.}, author = {Friedrich, Tobias and Ihde, Sven and Keßler, Christoph and Lenzner, Pascal and Neubert, Stefan and Schumann, David}, booktitle = {Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {christophkessler davidschumann pascallenzner sagt stefanneubert svenihde tobiasfriedrich year2017}, pages = {199-211}, title = {Efficient Best Response Computation for Strategic Network Formation under Attack}, year = 2017 }

2016

Chauhan, Ankit; Lenzner, Pascal; Melnichenko, Anna; Münn, Martin On Selfish Creation of Robust NetworksSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2016: 141–152
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ URL ] [ DOI ] [ Download ]
 
Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority. Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents. Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown networks are surprisingly robust while at the same time having desirable properties like a small diameter. To investigate this phenomenon we present the first simple model for selfish network creation which explicitly incorporates agents striving for a central position in the network while at the same time protecting themselves against random edge-failure. We show that networks in our model are diverse and we prove the versatility of our model by adapting various properties and techniques from the non-robust versions which we then use for establishing bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Moreover, we analyze the computational hardness of finding best possible strategies and investigate the game dynamics of our model.
@inproceedings{Chauhan2016, abstract = {Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority. Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents. Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown networks are surprisingly robust while at the same time having desirable properties like a small diameter. To investigate this phenomenon we present the first simple model for selfish network creation which explicitly incorporates agents striving for a central position in the network while at the same time protecting themselves against random edge-failure. We show that networks in our model are diverse and we prove the versatility of our model by adapting various properties and techniques from the non-robust versions which we then use for establishing bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Moreover, we analyze the computational hardness of finding best possible strategies and investigate the game dynamics of our model.}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, author = {Chauhan, Ankit and Lenzner, Pascal and Melnichenko, Anna and Münn, Martin}, booktitle = {Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, editor = {Gairing, Martin and Savani, Rahul}, keywords = {ankitchauhan annamelnichenko pascallenzner sagt year2016}, pages = {141-152}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, title = {On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks}, year = 2016 }

Cseh, Ágnes; Irving, Robert W.; Manlove, David F. The Stable Roommates Problem with Short ListsSymposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2016: 207–219
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ URL ] [ DOI ]
 
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (sri) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-sri, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of sri with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if \($d=3$\). On the positive side we give a \(\frac{2d+3}{7}\)-approximation algorithm for \(d \in\{3,4,5\}\) which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of sri, called d-srti, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-srti admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if \($d=3$\). We also consider the “most stable” version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the \($d=3$\) case. However for \($d=2$\) we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time.
@inproceedings{cseh2016stable, abstract = {We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (sri) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-sri, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of sri with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if \($d=3$\). On the positive side we give a \(\frac{2d+3}{7}\)-approximation algorithm for \(d \in\{3,4,5\}\) which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of sri, called d-srti, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-srti admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if \($d=3$\). We also consider the “most stable” version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the \($d=3$\) case. However for \($d=2$\) we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time.}, author = {Cseh, Ágnes and Irving, Robert W. and Manlove, David F.}, booktitle = {Symposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {sys:relevantfor:ae agnescseh davidfmanlove robertwirving sagt year2016}, pages = {207-219}, title = {The Stable Roommates Problem with Short Lists}, year = 2016 }

2015

Cseh, Ágnes; Manlove, David F. Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and ApproximabilitySymposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2015: 15–26
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ URL ] [ DOI ]
 
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually acceptable agents. If any two agents mutually prefer each other to their partner, then they block the matching, otherwise, the matching is said to be stable. We investigate the complexity of finding a solution satisfying additional constraints on restricted pairs of agents. Restricted pairs can be either forced or forbidden. A stable solution must contain all of the forced pairs, while it must contain none of the forbidden pairs. Dias et al. [5] gave a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether such a solution exists in the presence of restricted edges. If the answer is no, one might look for a solution close to optimal. Since optimality in this context means that the matching is stable and satisfies all constraints on restricted pairs, there are two ways of relaxing the constraints by permitting a solution to: (1) be blocked by as few as possible pairs, or (2) violate as few as possible constraints on restricted pairs. Our main theorems prove that for the (bipartite) stable marriage problem, case (1) leads to NP-hardness and inapproximability results, whilst case (2) can be solved in polynomial time. For non-bipartite stable roommates instances, case (2) yields an NP-hard but (under some cardinality assumptions) 2-approximable problem. In the case of NP-hard problems, we also discuss polynomially solvable special cases, arising from restrictions on the lengths of the preference lists, or upper bounds on the numbers of restricted pairs.
@inproceedings{cseh2015stable, abstract = {In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually acceptable agents. If any two agents mutually prefer each other to their partner, then they block the matching, otherwise, the matching is said to be stable. We investigate the complexity of finding a solution satisfying additional constraints on restricted pairs of agents. Restricted pairs can be either forced or forbidden. A stable solution must contain all of the forced pairs, while it must contain none of the forbidden pairs. Dias et al. [5] gave a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether such a solution exists in the presence of restricted edges. If the answer is no, one might look for a solution close to optimal. Since optimality in this context means that the matching is stable and satisfies all constraints on restricted pairs, there are two ways of relaxing the constraints by permitting a solution to: (1) be blocked by as few as possible pairs, or (2) violate as few as possible constraints on restricted pairs. Our main theorems prove that for the (bipartite) stable marriage problem, case (1) leads to NP-hardness and inapproximability results, whilst case (2) can be solved in polynomial time. For non-bipartite stable roommates instances, case (2) yields an NP-hard but (under some cardinality assumptions) 2-approximable problem. In the case of NP-hard problems, we also discuss polynomially solvable special cases, arising from restrictions on the lengths of the preference lists, or upper bounds on the numbers of restricted pairs.}, author = {Cseh, Ágnes and Manlove, David F.}, booktitle = {Symposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {sys:relevantfor:ae agnescseh davidfmanlove sagt year2015}, pages = {15-26}, title = {Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability}, year = 2015 }

2014

Cseh, Ágnes; Skutella, Martin Paths to Stable AllocationsSymposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2014: 61–73
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ URL ] [ DOI ]
 
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case of uncoordinated processes in stable allocation instances. In this setting, a feasible allocation is given and the aim is to reach a stable allocation by raising the value of the allocation along blocking edges and reducing it on worse edges if needed. Do such myopic changes lead to a stable solution? In our present work, we analyze both better and best response dynamics from an algorithmic point of view. With the help of two deterministic algorithms we show that random procedures reach a stable solution with probability one for all rational input data in both cases. Surprisingly, while there is a polynomial path to stability when better response strategies are played (even for irrational input data), the more intuitive best response steps may require exponential time. We also study the special case of correlated markets. There, random best response strategies lead to a stable allocation in expected polynomial time.
@inproceedings{cseh2014paths, abstract = {The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case of uncoordinated processes in stable allocation instances. In this setting, a feasible allocation is given and the aim is to reach a stable allocation by raising the value of the allocation along blocking edges and reducing it on worse edges if needed. Do such myopic changes lead to a stable solution? In our present work, we analyze both better and best response dynamics from an algorithmic point of view. With the help of two deterministic algorithms we show that random procedures reach a stable solution with probability one for all rational input data in both cases. Surprisingly, while there is a polynomial path to stability when better response strategies are played (even for irrational input data), the more intuitive best response steps may require exponential time. We also study the special case of correlated markets. There, random best response strategies lead to a stable allocation in expected polynomial time.}, author = {Cseh, Ágnes and Skutella, Martin}, booktitle = {Symposium Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {sys:relevantfor:ae agnescseh martinskutella sagt year2014}, pages = {61-73}, title = {Paths to Stable Allocations}, year = 2014 }

2011

Lenzner, Pascal On Dynamics in Basic Network Creation GamesSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2011: 254–265
[ Abstract ] [ BibTeX ] [ DOI ] [ Download ]
 
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the Sum Basic Network Creation Game, which was recently introduced by Alon et al.[SPAA'10]. In this game players are associated to vertices in a graph and are allowed to "swap" edges, that is to remove an incident edge and insert a new incident edge. By performing such moves, every player tries to minimize her connection cost, which is the sum of distances to all other vertices. When played on a tree, we prove that this game admits an ordinal potential function, which implies guaranteed convergence to a pure Nash Equilibrium. We show a cubic upper bound on the number of steps needed for any improving response dynamic to converge to a stable tree and propose and analyse a best response dynamic, where the players having the highest cost are allowed to move. For this dynamic we show an almost tight linear upper bound for the convergence speed. Furthermore, we contrast these positive results by showing that, when played on general graphs, this game allows best response cycles. This implies that there cannot exist an ordinal potential function and that fundamentally different techniques are required for analysing this case. For computing a best response we show a similar contrast: On the one hand we give a linear-time algorithm for computing a best response on trees even if players are allowed to swap multiple edges at a time. On the other hand we prove that this task is NP-hard even on simple general graphs, if more than one edge can be swapped at a time. The latter addresses a proposal by Alon et al..
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/sagt/Lenzner11, abstract = {We initiate the study of game dynamics in the Sum Basic Network Creation Game, which was recently introduced by Alon et al.[SPAA'10]. In this game players are associated to vertices in a graph and are allowed to "swap" edges, that is to remove an incident edge and insert a new incident edge. By performing such moves, every player tries to minimize her connection cost, which is the sum of distances to all other vertices. When played on a tree, we prove that this game admits an ordinal potential function, which implies guaranteed convergence to a pure Nash Equilibrium. We show a cubic upper bound on the number of steps needed for any improving response dynamic to converge to a stable tree and propose and analyse a best response dynamic, where the players having the highest cost are allowed to move. For this dynamic we show an almost tight linear upper bound for the convergence speed. Furthermore, we contrast these positive results by showing that, when played on general graphs, this game allows best response cycles. This implies that there cannot exist an ordinal potential function and that fundamentally different techniques are required for analysing this case. For computing a best response we show a similar contrast: On the one hand we give a linear-time algorithm for computing a best response on trees even if players are allowed to swap multiple edges at a time. On the other hand we prove that this task is NP-hard even on simple general graphs, if more than one edge can be swapped at a time. The latter addresses a proposal by Alon et al..}, author = {Lenzner, Pascal}, booktitle = {Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, keywords = {imported pascallenzner sagt year2011}, pages = {254-265}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title = {On Dynamics in Basic Network Creation Games}, volume = 6982, year = 2011 }