Bilò, Davide; Bilò, Vittorio; Lenzner, Pascal; Molitor, Louise Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling GamesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AGNT) 2022: 47
Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling's famous agent-based model for residential segregation explains how such clusters can form even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., if they agree to live in mixed neighborhoods. For segregation to occur, all it needs is a slight bias towards agents preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, Schelling's model has been investigated from a game-theoretic point of view with selfish agents that strategically select their residential location. In these games, agents can improve on their current location by performing a location swap with another agent who is willing to swap. We significantly deepen these investigations by studying the influence of the underlying topology modeling the residential area on the existence of equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and on the dynamic properties of the resulting strategic multi-agent system. Moreover, as a new conceptual contribution, we also consider the influence of locality, i.e., if the location swaps are restricted to swaps of neighboring agents. We give improved almost tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy for arbitrary underlying graphs and we present (almost) tight bounds for regular graphs, paths and cycles. Moreover, we give almost tight bounds for grids, which are commonly used in empirical studies. For grids we also show that locality has a severe impact on the game dynamics.
Berenbrink, Petra; Hoefer, Martin; Kaaser, Dominik; Lenzner, Pascal; Rau, Malin; Schmand, Daniel Asynchronous Opinion Dynamics in Social NetworksAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS) 2022: 109–117
Opinion spreading in a society decides the fate of elections, the success of products, and the impact of political or social movements. The model by Hegselmann and Krause is a well-known theoretical model to study such opinion formation processes in social networks. In contrast to many other theoretical models, it does not converge towards a situation where all agents agree on the same opinion. Instead, it assumes that people find an opinion reasonable if and only if it is close to their own. The system converges towards a stable situation where agents sharing the same opinion form a cluster, and agents in different clusters do not influence each other. We focus on the social variant of the Hegselmann-Krause model where agents are connected by a social network and their opinions evolve in an iterative process. When activated, an agent adopts the average of the opinions of its neighbors having a similar opinion. By this, the set of influencing neighbors of an agent may change over time. To the best of our knowledge, social Hegselmann-Krause systems with asynchronous opinion updates have only been studied with the complete graph as social network. We show that such opinion dynamics with random agent activation are guaranteed to converge for any social network. We provide an upper bound of \(\mathcal{O(n |E|^2 (\varepsilon/\delta)^2)\) on the expected number of opinion updates until convergence, where |E| is the number of edges of the social network. For the complete social network we show a bound of \( \mathcal{O(n^3(n^2 + (\varepsilon/\delta)^2)) \) that represents a major improvement over the previously best upper bound of \( \mathcal{O(n^9(\varepsilon/\delta)^2) \). Our bounds are complemented by simulations that indicate asymptotically matching lower bounds.
Führlich, Pascal; Cseh, Ágnes; Lenzner, Pascal Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess TournamentsACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) 2022: 1101–1102
The International Chess Federation (FIDE) imposes a voluminous and complex set of player pairing criteria in Swiss-system chess tournaments and endorses computer programs that are able to calculate the prescribed pairings. The purpose of these formalities is to ensure that players are paired fairly during the tournament and that the final ranking corresponds to the players' true strength order. We contest the official FIDE player pairing routine by presenting alternative pairing rules. These can be enforced by computing maximum weight matchings in a carefully designed graph. We demonstrate by extensive experiments that a tournament format using our mechanism (1) yields fairer pairings in the rounds of the tournament and (2) produces a final ranking that reflects the players' true strengths better than the state-of-the-art FIDE pairing system.
Friedrich, Tobias; Gawendowicz, Hans; Lenzner, Pascal; Melnichenko, Anna Social Distancing Network CreationInternational Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP) 2022: 62:1–62:21
During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network creation model in which selfish agents can form bilateral connections. They benefit from network neighbors, but at the same time, they want to maximize their distance to all other agents. This models the inherent conflict that social distancing rules impose on the behavior of selfish agents in a social network. Besides addressing this familiar issue, our model can be seen as the inverse to the well-studied Network Creation Game by Fabrikant et al.~[PODC 2003] where agents aim at being as central as possible in the created network. Thus, our work is in-line with studies that compare minimization problems with their maximization versions. We look at two variants of network creation governed by social distancing. In the first variant, there are no restrictions on the connections being formed. We characterize optimal and equilibrium networks, and we derive asymptotically tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The second variant is the model's generalization that allows restrictions on the connections that can be formed. As our main result, we prove that Swap-Maximal Routing-Cost Spanning Trees, an efficiently computable weaker variant of Maximum Routing-Cost Spanning Trees, actually resemble equilibria for a significant range of the parameter space. Moreover, we give almost tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. These results imply that, compared the well-studied inverse models, under social distancing the agents' selfish behavior has a significantly stronger impact on the quality of the equilibria, i.e., allowing socially much worse stable states.
Bilò, Davide; Bilò, Vittorio; Lenzner, Pascal; Molitor, Louise Tolerance is Necessary for Stability: Single-Peaked Swap Schelling GamesInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) 2022: 81–87
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility function that ensures higher utility if an agent has more same-type neighbors. The agents strategically choose their location on a given graph that serves as residential area to maximize their utility. However, sociological polls suggest that real-world agents are actually favoring mixed-type neighborhoods, and hence should be modeled via non-monotone utility functions. To address this, we study Swap Schelling Games with single-peaked utility functions. Our main finding is that tolerance, i.e., agents favoring fifty-fifty neighborhoods or being in the minority, is necessary for equilibrium existence on almost regular or bipartite graphs. Regarding the quality of equilibria, we derive (almost) tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. In particular, we show that the latter is constant on bipartite and almost regular graphs.
Bullinger, Martin; Lenzner, Pascal; Melnichenko, Anna Network Creation with Homophilic AgentsInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) 2022: 151–157
Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks such as social networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price leading to a network among them. However, in real life, agents are heterogeneous and their relationships often display a bias towards similar agents, say of the same ethnic group. This homophilic behavior on the agent level can then lead to the emergent global phenomenon of social segregation. We initiate the study of Network Creation Games with multiple types of homophilic agents and non-uniform edge cost. Specifically, we introduce and compare two models, focusing on the perception of same-type and different-type neighboring agents, respectively. Despite their different initial conditions, both our theoretical and experimental analysis show that the resulting equilibrium networks are almost identical in the two models, indicating a robust structure of social networks under homophily. Moreover, we investigate the segregation strength of the formed networks and thereby offer new insights on understanding segregation.